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Introduction and background
Following the latest crisis, the economics community as well as the entire financial industry attracted a new round of criticism. This time financial products received a large portion of the blame. The quality and even the purpose of financial products became suspect.
In response to this criticism we proposed a theory of rational product design [1] . Within this theory the mathematical structure of financial products is no longer left to intuition. It follows from the customer's intended behaviour.
The infamous Equity Premium Puzzle [2] , which has been defying mainstream economics for over 30 years, provided the perfect opportunity to test this theory against real data. Indeed, one cannot claim understanding of human financial decisions while remaining puzzled by the real-life performance of such basic instruments as equities and bonds.
Despite going back to the original ideas of Bayes and Bernoulli and sharing many of its key concepts with mainstream economics, our approach to financial products (let us call it "Quantitative Structuring") fits and even predicts the observed data.
Quantitative Structuring is successful in explaining the equity premium because it does not follow the classical paradigm of a consumption-based economy populated by identical copies of a representative agent. Instead, it reflects a more detailed naturalistic view of economics with large behavioural diversity.
As an illustration, imagine a naturalist at work observing a bird's nest, a rabbit hole and a bone bearing bite marks from a predator. The naturalist would never try to explain such a diverse set of observations using a theory of a representative animal which is somehow responsible for all of the observations. And even though life on Earth is powered largely by the Sun, the naturalist would not speak of optimal consumption of solar power as an explanation of complex behaviours.
The economic landscape is similar: it is populated by a diverse set of economic strategies. Each strategy is rational in its own way and leaves behind its own mark.
Hedging and investments are examples of very different types of strategies. Traditional economic models tend to focus on hedging. Indeed, models which assume market efficiency can do little else. Quantitative Structuring describes a class of pure investment strategies where the investor actively expresses a view on the market (the investor earns a living by learning new information and bringing that information to the market).
The observed equity premiums appear to come from investment strategies and not from hedging behaviours such as smoothing of consumption.
The Equity Premium Puzzle
In 1985 Mehra and Prescott investigated historical data on the long-term excess returns achieved by equities over government bonds [2] . These excess returns, known as the equity premium, appeared to be surprisingly high (confirming an independent observation of Shiller [3] ). Mehra and Prescott estimated that the equity premium was an order of magnitude greater than could be rationalized within the standard consumption-based theories.
Given the importance of this challenge, proposals to resolve the puzzle quickly snowballed. Two decades later Mehra and Prescott revisited the progress which had been made on the problem only to reinforce their original conclusions [4] . They estimated the equity premium to be up to 8% in arithmetic terms or up to 6% in terms of geometric (compound) returns and reiterated the Equity Premium Puzzle as an unresolved challenge to explain these values. A more recent independent study suggested that the puzzle may be even deeper than originally estimated [5] . At the time of writing it would be fair to say that no single explanation of the puzzle has yet received general acceptance and the search for a clear dominant explanation continues.
So what exactly is the problem? There are two main aspects to the puzzle. First of all, there is the numerical fact which demands explanation: the recorded premiums of up to 6% annualized compound returns. Our primary goal is to find a human behaviour which explains such numerical levels. The second aspect has to do with the scientific quality of explanation. The goal is not to come up with an elaborate theory that is complex enough to accommodate the possibility of such high premiums. What we need is a parsimonious theory which has no choice but to predict the correct magnitude of the premium.
In their original paper [2] Mehra and Prescott considered the classical model based on two fundamental assumptions. The first assumption is that the entire economy consists of very similar participants; so much so that it can be described using the concept of a representative agent. The second assumption is that the agents' motivation can be summarized as consumption optimization. This model is a perfect example of parsimony. It makes very specific testable predictions about the equity premium. Unfortunately, as shown by Mehra and Presott, the predictions disagree with the reality [2] .
Departure from the above classical assumptions became inevitable. The representative agent model was challenged almost immediately after the discovery of the puzzle [6] . Despite becoming somewhat of an ideology, the postulate of optimal consumption also started to lose ground as behavioural corrections were introduced [7, 8] .
Unfortunately, the debates were set to continue as the new developments appeared at the expense of parsimony. The new theories maintained significant allegiance to the original consumption-based theory, upgrading it with additional factors rather than proposing a genuine alternative. For example, the myopic loss aversion effect in [8] can be introduced or removed at will depending on the frequency of portfolio evaluations. Similarly, the habit formation models (see e.g. [9] ) include the classic model of optimal consumption as a special case. Such mathematical anchoring on the idea of optimal consumption meant that, in contrast to the actual observations, the new theories have never really rejected small equity premiums. They simply introduced additional parameters to accommodate a wider range of possibilities.
Can it be that not all economically significant human behaviours optimize consumption? In particular, can it be that consumption optimization does not cause the observed equity premiums? We think that the answer for both of these questions is yes. The long history of the Equity Premium Puzzle serves as evidence towards this conclusion. Indeed, we have seen a variety of independent attempts to deviate from the original assumptions. Many such attempts appeared as moves in the right direction. This is a clear sign that we should consider rejecting both the idea of a representative agent and the postulate of optimal consumption as a theory for equity premiums.
Quantitative Structuring
Our understanding of the equity premium is based on recognizing equities as a member of a large class of financial products. This section provides a basic review of what financial products are and introduces Quantitative Structuring as a theory for their design.
Financial products are defined by their payoff function, F (x), which states how the benefits (usually cash flows) depend on the underlying variables, x. Such products, also known as financial derivatives, are designed to be bought and sold as a single trade.
We have been trading financial products since ancient times. However, it is only relatively recently, building on the works of Black, Scholes and Merton [10, 11] , that we found a rational framework for pricing such products. In order to price a product, defined by its payoff F , we compute a quantity of the form
where the summation is taken over all possible values of the underlying variables and where the weighting function Q is implied by a so-called pricing model.
So far, within the industry of financial derivatives, most quantitative effort has gone into modeling, i.e. the study of Q. This was enough to create a dedicated mathematical discipline and an entire new profession of "financial engineers" better known as "quants". Quants are not normally involved in product design. "Good quants" are expected to price any product. For them products are challenges, a source of modeling requirements.
A closer look at Eq. (1) reveals that the value of a product is determined by both its payoff structure F and the pricing model Q in a remarkably symmetric way. If modeling requires a dedicated mathematical framework, so does product design.
Quantitative Structuring recognizes the importance of financial products and provides a technical framework for their design [1] . Currently, this framework is a fusion between basic logical elements of learning theory and rational optimization. The rest of this section provides a brief technical introduction.
Consider an investor with an interest in some market variable x (future stock price, currency exchange rate, etc.). The investor's entire knowledge about the variable can be summarized as a list of all possible values for the variable alongside the investor's opinion on their probabilities {x, p(x)}. We recognize this as a probability distribution and conclude that the investor's knowledge should be subject to the logic of probability theory. In particular, upon discovery of some data d any logical investor must update their knowledge from p(x) to p(x|d) using Bayes' theorem
where L d (x) is known as the likelihood function.
Let the probability distribution p(x) summarize all known information about x. We see that the likelihood function L d (x) in Eq. (2) is the only object describing the learning of new information on top of the already known p(x). If we believe in research-based investments which deliver new information to the markets, we must seek a framework in which the payoff function F (x) of any x-contingent investment is explicitly related to the likelihood function L d (x) describing the relevant research.
It would be good to find such a framework among rational optimizations for that would also clarify the goals achieved by financial derivatives.
To our knowledge, Bernoulli's treatment of the St Petersburg paradox [12] was the first example of understanding investors' rationale in the context of a single financial product. The product was entirely hypothetical (the payoff from a certain game) but, nevertheless, it had the defining ingredient of all modern financial derivatives -a contingent cashflow deriving its value from an outcome of a random variable.
Von Neumann and Morgenstern put Bernoulli's intuitive understanding of rationality on firm axiomatic grounds [13] . The expected utility framework which followed from this work turned out to be very rich, containing many models including ones that have no meaningful connection to the process of learning as described by Eq. (2). For instance, it contains the famous Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). Basic CAPM (see e.g. [14] ) assumes that all information is completely objective and is agreed upon by all investors, so there is literally nothing left to learn.
Let us come back to the original Bernoulli setup and generalize it just enough to allow the investor to freely develop their own knowledge (both about the market and about their private circumstances). The optimal payoff function F for such an investor would solve an optimization problem of the form
where U is the utility function, b(x) is the investor-believed probability distribution, and the values of {m(x)} are offer prices for generalized Arrow-Debrew securities (these can be readily obtained for almost any variable by calling an investment bank). After a trivial normalization, {m(x)} defines a probability distribution which we call market-implied.
It turns out that the solution F of the optimization (3) can be understood in terms of the likelihood functions describing investment research -just as we demanded above. In particular, we can imagine two learning steps of the Bayesian form (2). One of these steps refers to the discovery of the investor-believed probabilities about the market variable, and the other describes a much more private learning of the investor's own preferences (risk aversion). The two steps correspond to a pair of equations (see Ref. [15] for details)
where the risk aversion coefficient R is connected to the utility U(F ) through the standard Arrow-Pratt formula: R = −F U ′′ F F /U ′ F , and f (x) can be understood as the payoff function for the growth-optimal product (F = f when R = 1 -the case of a Kelly investor [16] ).
The logical structure (2) of Eq. (4) is easy to see: the market-implied m and the investorbelieved b naturally take the places of the prior and the posterior distributions respectively, while the growth-optimal payoff f coincides with the likelihood function.
Understanding more general payoffs in terms of the relevant likelihood functions and how that leads to Eq. (5) is a bit more involved. For more detailed explanations of Eqs. (4) and (5) including motivation, derivations, intuitive illustrations as well as concrete numerical examples (including product performance), we refer the reader to [1] , [15] , [17] , [18] and [19] .
The expected utility framework is so good at unifying diverse economic motivations that, looking at Eq.(3), it may not be obvious how different Quantitative Structuring is from the consumption-based attempts to understand the equity premium. To see this more clearly, consider an investor which agrees with the market. Substituting b(x) = m(x) into Eq. (4) we see that the investor would not trade (the payoff does not depend on x).
In real life such an investor would say that they "have no edge" or "see no investable opportunity" on the market. Equations (4) and (5) convert knowledge into a product. No view on the market means no trade.
Contrast this with [2] where none of the agents have any view on the market. For them the value of a financial product comes from its covariance with consumption. The strategy of such agents is best described as hedging (smoothing of consumption) rather than investing.
An appeal to examine economic phenomena at the level of individual investment strategies would not be very useful if it came without understanding how we can get information at such a granular level. It turns out that Quantitative Structuring has a built-in source of such information. We defer the relevant discussion to the concluding section where we can leverage the readers' experience from understanding the main part of this paper.
2 Confronting the Equity Premium Puzzle
Expected premiums
The Equity Premium Puzzle is about the already realized performance of equities above bonds. However, the realized performance is only a half the picture. Investors do have expectations. These expectations must make sense. Without that the investments have little chance of even starting, let alone surviving long term. We must understand the investor-expected premiums.
On Fig. 1 we display independent empirical quotes for the expected equity premiums as reported by Damodaran [20] using SPX data. We see that these values are just as large as the historical records by Mehra and Prescott -at least an order of magnitude above 0.35% per annum quoted in [2] . The aim of this section is to explain these values.
Using the notation of (3), we can write the investor-expected continuously-compounded rate of return as
As we focus on equity investments, we choose x to be the total return on one unit of wealth invested in some equity and write 
In order to compute this quantity we just need the ability to price power payoffs, x R . For that we use the industry-standard approach of static replication with vanilla options (see Ref. [21] and Appendix 4.2). In terms of market information, this replication needs the implied volatility curve at the same maturity as the payoff x R .
According to Damodaran [20] , his quotes for the premiums accurately reflect detailed market information (such as market-implied dividends) of up to five years into the future. Similarly, our SPX volatility surfaces use exchange traded options with maturities of up to five years. The solid line on Fig. 2 depicts the values of R obtained from reconciling Eq. (8) with the data on Fig. 1 using the complete historical records of 5-year volatility curves.
In order to verify the robustness of our calculations, reduce the dependency on market data sources, and to develop a more transparent example of our calculations we also consider a flat-volatility market
where DF is the discount factor, r is the risk free return and σ is the volatility. In this 
This gives us the ballpark estimate of the expected equity premium of (R − 1/2)σ 2 .
The dashed line on Fig. 2 shows the value of R implied from equating the annualized value of the premium (ER LN R − r) with the relevant quoted value from Fig. 1 . In this calculation we used the 5-year at-the-money-forward implied volatilities (displayed for convenience on Fig. 3 ). Both graphs on Fig. 2 show good agreement indicating robustness of our calculations.
In their pioneering paper [2] , Mehra and Prescott argue that the acceptable values for R must be below 10. In fact, all of the actual estimates of R which they cite to support their argument were below 3. 1 This is in remarkable agreement with Fig. 2 .
Even with minimal knowledge of volatility, making the standard assumption of 20% for typical equity volatility, the risk aversion values of up to 3 allow us to explain premiums as high as 10% in terms of continuously compounded annual returns. We conclude that, in terms of investors' expectations, Quantitative Structuring is consistent with the observed equity premiums.
Realized premiums
In the above section we found the ballpark rational expectations of equity premiums to be just as high as the actually realized values [2] . In this section we would like to understand how this happens: how the investors' expectations materialize, with investors doing no more than just keeping their money in the equity.
Let S t be the value of the total return version of some equity index at time t. The return on the equity can be partitioned arbitrarily into N imaginary reinvestment steps:
Defining
where
Let us now look at this quantity using the standard statistical approach. In this approach the individual elements {x i } are viewed as realizations of a random variable X with some (possibly unknown) distribution P (X). For the basic statistical concepts to make practical sense, the law of large numbers is assumed to hold. 2 In this framework, as N increases, the average (13) converges almost surely to the expectation:
Compare this with Eq. (6) (remember F (x) = x for equity investments). We see that the investor-expected returns are achieved when the investors' market beliefs agree with the reality b(x) = P (x).
With good access to market data, one can use Eqs (4) and (5) This gives us the choice of two equivalent ways in which we can test the theory against the observed reality. We can assume realistic levels of risk aversion and check if this prevents our investor from believing the correct probabilities. Alternatively, we can say that investors' behaviour (i.e. their investment in equities) is consistent with the belief b = P and check if this gives us the realistic levels of risk aversion.
Following Mehra and Prescott [2] , we take the latter route. In this case, as we explained above, the expected return (13) evaluates to the actual realized returns exactly, so to explain the observed equity premium we just need to examine the corresponding level of risk aversion.
Before we do that, let us briefly discuss the choice of partitioning in Eq. (11) . Although we are free to examine any such partitioning, some choices are more interesting than others. Partitions with very small N are not useful because they would not give us enough data to achieve statistically meaningful convergence (14) . The opposite extreme of very large N brings us to the domain of high-frequency trading which is normally practiced by people with a mindset that is very different from a long-term investment.
Ideally, we want to focus on the smallest possible N that is large enough to ensure noticeable convergence (14) . The standard deviation of the sum (13) from its mean (14) scales as N −1/2 . For the first significant digit of the sum (13) to emerge with reasonable probability, the convergence must reduce the standard deviation by an order of magnitude (N −1/2 ∼ 0.1). This means that we must choose N which is not much lower than 100.
We managed to find full market data, including volatility surfaces, for SPXT (total return version of SPX) going back to 17 May 2000. At the time of writing, this was about 15 years worth of data (daily records). Some researchers might argue the need for longer historical records. However, 15-year investments are already at the limit of what many people would consider practical, so we choose to accept it. Viewing 15 years of the entire investment history (11) as if it was a sequence of bi-monthly reinvestments we get N = 90 reinvestment periods. The corresponding returns {x i } N i=1 can be used as Monte-Carlo realizations of P (x). As discussed above, this amount of data is just enough to talk about averages like (13) in terms of expectations (14) .
Using Eqs. (4) and (5) and recalling for the simple equity investment F (x) = x, we compute
Theoretically, this gives us the entire risk-aversion profile for the investor in question.
Right now, however, we have a bare minimum of statistical data. So, as many other researchers before us have done, we choose to focus on the overall level of risk aversion and defer the very interesting topic of the shape of risk-aversion profiles to further research. As a measure of the overall risk aversion we consider the average
Put together, the above two equations give (see Eq. (37) in Appendix 4.3)
This formula does not look very intuitive so, before using it, let us spend a few lines understanding it. To this end, let us see what it implies for a log-normal market-implied distribution. Substituting Eq. (9) into the above formula we derive (see Eq.
Compare this to Eq. (10) which we studied above. We recognize Eq. (17) as a generalized analog of Eq. (10). The extent of generalization is very substantial: the market can have any implied distribution, and the investor can have an arbitrary profile of risk-aversion.
We now recall taking the logical route where b(x) = P (x) and, using Eq. (17), we obtain the final formula for the overall level of risk aversion
We are now in a position to compute R P as seen on any day for which we have enough market data to compute m (see Appendix 4.4) .
We should remember, however, that our investor took a 15-year view and is completely ignoring all intermediate updates from the markets. The level of risk aversion for such an investor should be measured in a way that represents most of the actual investment period and is not sensitive to intermediate market fluctuations. Below we report two kinds of experiments which achieve this. In the first kind we look at the averaged value of R P across the entire 15-year investment period. This is really the only kind of experiment for which we have enough data. In the second type we attempt to get a glimpse of the term structure of risk aversion by looking at a 10-year moving average.
Our choice to view historical investments as sequences of bi-monthly reinvestments has a useful side effect. A single experiment would skip most of the available market data using only what it needs at bi-monthly intervals. The skipped market data can be used to repeat the experiment (42 times in total) -we just need to start the bi-monthly sequence on a different business day within the first two months for which we have data. The solid upward-trending (red) line on Fig. 4 is a bi-monthly report of the 10-year moving average of R P for the investment which started on the 17th of May 2000 -the first day for which we have market data. The 42 runs of this experiment are plotted by faint dashed lines across the same graph. Using only 2/3 of the data (10 out of 15 years) this experiment serves as a stability check and as an indicator for the termstructure of risk aversion. We see that the risk aversion levels are perturbed, but remain realistic. The increasing trend is resonating with the expectations of Fig. 2 and matches the increasingly risk averse sentiments on the global markets (from borderline careless prior the crisis to strongly risk averse currently).
While discussing historical premiums, we must mention that the performance of equities over the last 15 years has been rather patchy. This has reduced the magnitude of the relevant historical equity premiums. 3 However, the reduction was not strong or persistent enough to remove large equity premiums across the entire data set used in this paper. Out of the 42 investments represented by the horizontal (green) lines on Fig. 4 , the worst and the best-performing ones delivered around 2% and 2.6% per annum in terms of the annualized equity premium. All of these values are well above 0.35% which was reported by Mehra and Presott as an upper limit of what can be explained by the mainstream approach [2] .
As a final remark, we would like to point the reader back to the discussion around Eqs. (17) (18) which brings together the two separate investigations of the expected and the realized premiums. Despite the fundamental differences in meaning and different technical challenges, the two types of premiums are very similar mathematically. In essence, both of them measure the difference between some distribution (either the investor-believed b or the realized P ) and the market-implied m. The two premiums coincide numerically when the investor's belief is correct, i.e. when b is close to P . Translating these numerical values into risk aversion we see that the premiums do indeed correspond to the realistic levels of risk aversion.
Epilogue: detailed economics
Economics is an ecosystem populated by strategies. Physically this is implemented within human society where a single person can play host to many strategies and a single strategy can become popular among many people. Each individual strategy is rational even though people may have complex personalities (inhabited by a myriad of conflicting strategies). Basic strategies may have strong genetic support, but most advanced ones propagate through the mechanisms of learning. Long-term survival in such an environment requires a strategy to make sense: both in terms of expectations and in terms of confirmation of these expectations by real-life performance.
In this paper we focused on equity investments as understood by Quantitative Structuring -the rational learning-based framework of product design. Our focus was motivated by the Equity Premium Puzzle -the apparent struggle of consumption-based models with the equity premium. We demonstrated in detail how investors with normal levels of risk aversion come to expect the seemingly high equity premiums and how such expectations materialize over long time horizons. In other words, our approach both predicts the correct value of the equity premium and provides the mechanism for its persistence in the real world.
The simplest message from the Equity Premium Puzzle faced by consumption models is that such models do not describe the behaviours that are responsible for the premium. Consumption smoothing with little or no view on the market is a hedging strategy. The observed equity premium is not caused by hedging. It is a signature of investments, i.e. strategies that take risk by challenging the market.
Quantitative explanation of the equity premium concludes the main part of this paper.
Although here we focused on equity investments, we could have just as easily examined any other investment strategy. Indeed, we could have studied virtually any payoff function F . It appears that we might have a general tool for examining the economic ecosystem at the level of individual strategies. Let us now conclude the paper by trying to understand the power and the current limitations of such a tool.
We have already mentioned that there is nothing new in trying to understand economics at a granular level. Most economists would already agree that the ideal economic theory should reflect the variety of strategies. The problem is that every attempt to get closer to this ideal inevitably faces the challenge of practicality. More detailed models need more detailed information.
Traditionally, the parsimony is enforced by making ad hoc simplifications: inventing representative agents, replacing the detailed description of an investment by a point on a mean-variance diagram. The resulting loss of information is hard to quantify and even harder to compensate for, even with the most reasonable of assumptions.
Information loss is bad for understanding investments because investments are extremely sensitive to information. Fortunately, we have found that investments also provide a lot of information. We see it reflected in their very structure -the payoff function. The payoff function can appear very simple or very complex -such appearances do not matter. What matters is that we know the exact payoff in all possible circumstances and that gives us a lot of information to work with.
The deep information content of payoff functions becomes both obvious and useful when we use it to derive the investors' views (see Eq. (4) for a growth-optimizing investor or Eq. (22) in Appendix 4.1 for a more general case). These views are very detailed -they are complete probability distributions. This is how we maintain the parsimony. On the one hand we treat investors as individuals who are free to learn and who are allowed to express any views they find logical. On the other hand we allow no room for speculation about what these views actually are. It is crucial that the views are not assumed, they are derived using the knowledge of payoff functions.
Discussions regarding the use of our methods in economics inevitably lead to the question of market equilibrium. Indeed, how could a model explain the existence of well-defined market prices if all investors within that model are allowed to have whatever views they want? It turns out that, at least in some simple cases, the unique equilibrium market can be very easily derived (see Appendix 4.5) .
In terms of current limitations, it is important to remember that Quantitative Structuring has its own motivation which is quite separate from economics. The motivation is the design of quality financial products. Eventually, this should cover both hedging and investments, but only investment products are currently considered. Thinking in terms of investment strategies includes a lot of practical cases [1] and, as we just saw, it is enough to understand the magnitude of the equity premium, but it does leave a lot of room for improvement. Deep understanding of hedging strategies (deep enough to package them as financial products) is an important milestone for future work. 
For the case of constant but otherwise arbitrary R the above equation is immediately integrated to obtain
This result together with Eq. (4) give us the investor-believed distribution
where we used the fact that b(x) is normalized. For the expected logarithmic return we compute
In this paper we focus on a straightforward equity investment. In this case F (x) = x, and Z becomes essentially the Rth moment of m. In the special case of log-normal market-implied distribution, this can be computed analytically (see Eq. (9) for notation)
and therefore
ER R : numerical computations
According to Eq. (8), we need the ability to compute Price(x R ). It is helpful to start with a more general case: instead of x R , let us consider a twice-differentiable function g(x). Using the popular notation (·) + = max(·, 0) we can write g(x) in a form that is well known in financial applications (see Eq. (1) in Ref. [21] )
Because x is the total return on one unit of wealth invested in equity, Price(x) = 1, and it follows
where O(y, k) is a function comprised from vanilla option prices (both puts and calls)
O(y, k) = price P(y) of a put option with strike y, y ≤ k price C(y) of a call option with strike y, y > k .
Let us set k := 1/DF . Eq. (28) simplifies to
Substituting
and
Finally, Eq. (8) becomes
This is exactly how ER R was computed as a function of R using the option prices. Annualized values of the premium (ER R + ln DF ) were then matched to the independently reported values (see Fig. 1 and Ref. [20] ). This was achieved by solving for R using the simple bisection method. The values of R implied in this way are plotted as the solid line in Fig. 2 .
R b : derivations
Substitution of Eq. (15) into Eq. (16) gives
Integrating by parts and noticing that xb ∞ 0 = 0, we obtain
Finally, using the notation defined by Eq. (16), we derive
In the main text of the paper we illustrate this expression using the special case of a log-normal market-implied distribution. In order to see what happens in this special case we use Eq. (9) and derive
Substitution into Eq. (37) gives
Rearranging the terms we derive
R P : numerical computations
Looking at Eq. (19) , computation of R P is straightforward as long as we can compute the quantity ln m(x i )
Let C(K) be the price of a call option with strike K. It is related to m via the pricing formula
which implies
Using market data to compute option prices as a function of strike, these quantities are easy to find by numerical differentiation. In the paper we used the straightforward finite difference approximation: 
Equilibrium market prices
Let us consider a market of financial products which derive their value from some variable x. Each investor i invests the amount of w i dollars by buying a product with some payoff function F i (x). Summing up across all market participants (including market makers) and assuming, for simplicity, that there are no defaults we compute
where W = i w i is the total amount of money invested in the market and DF is the money market discount factor.
The rest of the argument is a straightforward application of the investor equivalence principle [15] . This principle is just a thinking tool which states that for every investor we can imagine a growth-optimizing investor which chooses the same product. Let β i (x) be the belief that a growth-optimizing investor must hold to buy F i (x). Mathematically,
where, assuming negligible bid-offer spreads, m(x) is the market that we are looking for. Substituting this into Eq. (45) we see that m(x) is unique
We note that this derivation says nothing about the stability of the equilibrium. In fact, we see that each market participant exerts some influence over the market. The market dynamics in such a system would depend on the size of the investor who discovers new information and how the newly discovered information spreads between the market participants of different sizes. Lux and Westerhoff argued such an interplay between heterogeneous agents calls for a yet another set of ideas which is currently missing from mainstream economics [22] .
